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ARE YOU THERE, GENEVA?
IT’S ME, GUANTÁNAMO
Keith A. Petty*
This essay examines the application of the Geneva Conventions at the 
Guantánamo Bay Military Commissions.  International and domestic com-
mentators have long criticized the military commissions for failing to ad-
here to the laws of armed conflict enshrined in Geneva, referring to Guan-
tánamo as a “legal black hole.” This criticism, however, is misplaced.  
Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, the legal framework for prosecut-
ing suspected terrorism detainees has evolved. The underlying reason for 
this is a considerable gap in the Geneva protective regime for combatants 
who do not satisfy the legal requirements of prisoners of war (GCIII) or 
civilians (GCIV).  Nonetheless, the Military Commissions Act of 2006 codi-
fies the U.S. application of the laws of war to Guantánamo accused.  As the 
pre-trial litigation in the case United States v. Hamdan demonstrates, the 
Geneva Conventions have been faithfully applied by the military commis-
sions contributing to a trial process that is full and fair. 
I. INTRODUCTION
On May 21, 2009, President Obama declared that military commis-
sions play an important role in prosecuting law of war offenses. This speech 
effectively revived the controversial Guantánamo Bay justice system. He 
stated, “[m]ilitary commissions have a history in the U.S. dating back to 
George Washington and the Revolutionary War. They are an appropriate 
venue for trying detainees for violations of the laws of war.”1
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School of Law; B.A. Indiana University. Served in the U.S. Army Judge Advocate General’s 
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Nonetheless, 
commentators maintain that the military commissions fail to comply with 
constitutional, international, and military legal obligations. In practice, 
1 President Barack Obama, Remarks on National Security at the National Archives and 
Records Administration, Daily Comp. Pres. Doc. 00388, at 5 (May 21, 2009), available at 
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/presdocs/2009/DCPD-200900388.pdf.
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however, the commissions have been at the cutting edge of these discip-
lines, particularly the law of armed conflict.
This essay examines the application of the law of armed conflict in 
military commission jurisprudence. In order to fully understand current 
practice it is necessary to discuss U.S. policy regarding the applicability of 
the Geneva Conventions to terrorist detainees at various times: immediately 
following September 11, 2001, the 2006 Supreme Court decision in Ham-
dan v. Rumsfeld as it relates to Common Article 3 of the Conventions, and 
the law of war aspects of the Military Commissions Act of 2006. Once the 
preliminary legal framework is established, this essay examines two pre-
trial rulings in the commission case United States. v. Hamdan, each dealing 
with the applicability of law of war provisions to Guantánamo accused. This 
essay concludes by questioning whether the laws governing armed conflicts 
of the past must be updated to provide greater protection to parties to mod-
ern conflicts. Only then will there be sufficient legal parameters set for all 
parties engaged in the struggle against terrorism.
II. A DEVELOPING LEGAL FRAMEWORK
A. The Pre-Hamdan Approach to Geneva
After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. was faced 
with the daunting task of determining the legal framework that applied to 
the perpetrators of these terrible crimes. When the U.S. led coalition in-
vaded Afghanistan in October 2001, there was no longer any question that 
the laws of armed conflict applied to the “global war on terror.”2 The U.S. 
government, however, determined that al-Qaeda terrorists and members of 
the Taliban captured during the course of this conflict did not meet the re-
quirements of prisoners of war and, as such, were not entitled to the protec-
tions of the Third Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prison-
ers of War (GCIII).3
I also accept the legal conclusion of the Department of Justice and deter-
mine that common Article 3 of [the Geneva Conventions] does not apply 
to either al Qaeda or Taliban detainees, because, among other reasons, the 
Moreover, former President Bush stated in a
memorandum, 
2 In fact, the armed conflict likely began at least in 1996 when Osama bin Laden issued 
his public fatwa calling on the forcible removal of U.S. personnel from Saudi Arabia and 
celebrating other attacks against the U.S. See NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON 
THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 48 (2004), available at http://www.gpoaccess.
gov/911/index.html.
3 White House Memorandum, Humane Treatment of Taliban and al Qaeda Detainees 
(Feb. 7, 2002), available at http://www.pegc.us/archive/White_House/bush_memo_
20020207_ed.pdf.
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relevant conflicts are international in scope and common Article 3 applies 
only to “armed conflict not of an international character.”4
The Bush administration’s policy was not without merit. The plain 
language of Common Article 3 provides protections to persons who are hors 
de combat—out of the fight—only “in the case of armed conflict not of an 
international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Con-
tracting Parties.”5 Additionally, Jean Pictet’s commentary to the Third Ge-
neva Convention explains that “it must be recognized that the conflicts re-
ferred to in Article 3 are armed conflicts, with ‘armed forces’ on either side 
engaged in ‘hostilities’—conflicts, in short, which are in many respects sim-
ilar to an international war, but take place within the confines of a single 
country.”6
Applying these standards it was reasonable to believe that the “war 
on terror” was international in scope. On its face, the conflict with al-Qaeda
was not limited to a single country since attacks had taken place in East 
Africa in the 1998 embassy bombings, off the Yemen coast in the bombing 
of the U.S.S. Cole in 2000, and of course the attacks in the U.S. in 2001.7
B. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld
This analysis, however, was upended when a Yemeni detainee, Salim Ham-
dan, took his case to the Supreme Court and won. 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s seminal 2006 decision in Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld8 changed U.S. policy regarding the law of armed conflict in the 
war on terror. In spite of the Executive’s arguments against the applicability 
of Geneva, the Court held that Article 21 of the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice required military commissions to comply with the law of war.9
Through this article, the Geneva Conventions were officially brought into 
the legal framework of military commissions.10
4 Id.
Specifically, the majority 
5 Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter GCIII] (setting international law standards 
for humanitarian treatment of victims of war).
6 INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY TO THE GENEVA CONVENTION (III)
RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR 37, available at http://www.icrc.org/
IHL.nsf/COM/375-590006?OpenDocument [hereinafter ICRC COMMENTARY III].
7 See, e.g., Posting of John Bellinger to OpinioJuris (January 25, 2007 21:26),
http://opiniojuris.org/2007/01/25/wrap-up-discussion-ii/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2009).
8 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
9 Id. at 628 (stating that “compliance with the law of war is the condition upon which the 
authority set forth in Article 21 is granted.”).
10 See id. See also id. at 602 (stating that “Congress, through Article 21 of the UCMJ, has 
‘incorporated by reference’ the common law of war . . . .”).
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found that Common Article 3 is applicable to the conflict between the U.S.
and al-Qaeda as a non-international armed conflict.11 The Court reasoned 
that the conflict was not international in scope because it did not involve 
two warring States, even though the conflict was primarily between the U.S.
and a foreign-based non-state armed group.12
C. The Military Commissions Act of 2006
The Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA) was enacted as a di-
rect response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdan. Besides contain-
ing the most comprehensive legal guide to the prosecution of unlawful 
combatants, the MCA directly references the law of armed conflict. Specifi-
cally, the MCA’s personal jurisdiction provisions reaffirm the critical dis-
tinction between lawful and unlawful combatants and the protections they 
are afforded.13
1. Personal jurisdiction and combatant status
Other provisions, including that the Geneva Conventions 
may not be used as a source of rights, have drawn considerable criticism. 
The following sections discuss each of these important issues.
Congress specified that military commissions may only exercise ju-
risdiction over alien unlawful enemy combatants.14 The MCA explains fur-
ther that lawful combatants may not be tried before a military commission.15
As discussed in more detail below, the distinction between lawful and un-
lawful combatants can be found in the Third Geneva Convention (GCIII).16
For the purposes of trial for law of war violations, lawful comba-
tants enjoy combatant immunity and may not be prosecuted merely for tak-
ing part in hostilities. According to the MCA, “[l]awful enemy combatants 
who violate the law of war are subject to [the Uniform Code of Military 
While the Conventions do not define persons as “lawful” or “unlawful” 
combatants, it follows naturally that a person who qualifies for the Conven-
tions’ prisoner of war protections is considered a “lawful” combatant.
11 Id. at 628–29. This application includes the prohibition against the “passing of sentences 
and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly 
constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable 
by civilized peoples.” Id. at 630 (quoting GCIII, supra note 5, art. 3(1)(d)).
12 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 628–30 (2006). See also Curtis A. Bradley, 
Agora (Continued): The Military Commissions Act of 2006: The Military Commissions Act, 
Habeas Corpus, and the Geneva Conventions, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 322, 337 (2007).
13 Military Commissions Act of 2006, 10 U.S.C. § 948d (2006).
14 See id. § 948d(a).
15 Id. § 948d(b).
16 See GCIII, supra note 5, art. 4.
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Justice],”17 the same law used to try U.S. soldiers at courts-martial.18
A lawful enemy combatant—someone not subject to trial by mili-
tary commission—is defined under the MCA as:
In 
contrast, unlawful combatants—those failing the elements of GCIII Article 
4—do not enjoy the belligerents’ privilege and may be prosecuted for their 
criminal acts before a military commission.
(A) a member of the regular forces of a State party engaged in hostilities 
against the United States; (B) a member of a militia, volunteer corps, or 
organized resistance movement belonging to a State party engaged in such 
hostilities, which are under responsible command, wear a fixed distinctive 
sign recognizable at a distance, carry their arms openly, and abide by the 
law of war; or (C) a member of a regular armed force who professes alle-
giance to a government engaged in such hostilities, but not recognized by 
the United States.19
The language above is taken directly from Article 4 of GCIII,20 with 
some notable exceptions. For example, in order to qualify as a prisoner of 
war in the Geneva framework, an individual must meet seven criteria. Five 
of these are explicitly listed above: operating under the authority of a gov-
ernment (“State party”), operating under responsible command, wearing 
fixed insignia, carrying arms openly, and following the laws of war. The 
following two criteria of Article 4 are not expressly mentioned in the MCA: 
the existence of an international armed conflict as required by Common 
Article 2 to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949,21 and the prohibition 
against acting unilaterally without belonging to an organization.22
Combatant immunity and the protections afforded prisoners of war 
are part of the customary laws of war. These norms developed in order to 
provide humane treatment for persons no longer taking part in hostilities.
When 
these criteria are met, combatants enjoy certain privileges upon capture, 
including combatant immunity.
23
17 Military Commissions Act of 2006, 10 U.S.C. § 948d(b) (2006).
18 See generally Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801–946 (2006).
19 Military Commissions Act of 2006, 10 U.S.C. § 948a(1)(B)(2) (2006).
20 See GCIII, supra note 5, art. 4.
21 Article 2 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 provides: “[T]he present 
Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or any other armed conflict which may 
arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not 
recognized by one of them.” An international armed conflict, then, is characterized as one 
between two or more States. See, e.g., GCIII, supra note 5, art. 2.
22 Id. art. 4.
23 Persons no longer taking part in hostilities are considered hors de combat. According to 
Article 41(2) of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions “[a] person is hors de com-
bat if: (a) He is in the power of an adverse Party; (b) He clearly expresses an intention to 
surrender; or (c) He has been rendered unconscious or is otherwise incapacitated by wounds 
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Over time the rules protecting persons hors de combat have been codified in 
various international treaties and regulations to include the Lieber Code,24
the Hague Convention II of 1899,25 the Hague Convention IV of 1907,26 the 
Geneva Convention of 1929,27 the Third Geneva Convention of 1949,28 and 
Additional Protocols I & II of 1979.29
U.S. federal courts have upheld the principle of combatant immuni-
ty, also known as the belligerents’ privilege. According to the court in Unit-
ed States v. Valentine, “[m]ere membership in the armed forces could not 
under any circumstances create criminal liability.”30 Similarly, in Johnson v. 
Eisentrager, Justice Black stated in his dissent that “it is no ‘crime’ to be a 
soldier.”31 More recently, in United States v. Lindh, the district court reaf-
firmed that the protections in GCIII “make clear that a belligerent in a war 
cannot prosecute the soldiers of its foes for the soldiers’ lawful acts of 
war.”32
In contrast to the many protections afforded lawful combatants, un-
lawful combatants do not enjoy the belligerents’ privilege. As this distinc-
tion relates to the Guantánamo Bay military commissions, it is important to 
clarify two points. First, enemy combatants may be detained irrespective of
or sickness, and therefore is incapable of defending himself.” Protocol Additional to the 
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Inter-
national Armed Conflict (Protocol I) art. 41(2), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter 
Additional Protocol I].
24 U.S. Dep’t. of War, General Orders No. 100, Instructions for the Government of Armies 
of the United States in the Field (April 24, 1863), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/
19th_century/lieber.asp [hereinafter Lieber Code].
25 1899 Hague Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land 
with Annex of Regulations, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, 1 Bevans 247. Article 3 of the 
annexed regulations provides that “[i]n case of capture by the enemy [combatants and non-
combatants] have a right to be treated as prisoners of war.” See id. annex art. 3.
26 Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 
2277, 1 Bevans 631 (adopting the same criteria as Hague II for lawful combatants and pris-
oner of war status).
27 Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, July 27, 1929, 47 Stat. 2021, 
118 L.N.T.S. 343 (setting international law standards for humanitarian treatment of victims 
of war).
28 GCIII, supra note 5.
29 Additional Protocol I, supra note 23; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 
12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Con-
flicts (Protocol II), adopted June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609.
30 288 F. Supp. 957, 987 (D.P.R. 1968) (citing Ford v. Surget, 97 U.S. 594, 605–06, 24 L. 
Ed. 1018 (1878)).
31 339 U.S. 763, 793 (1950) (Black, J., dissenting).
32 212 F. Supp. 2d 541, 553 (E.D. Va. 2002).
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the lawfulness of their status.33 Distinguishing between law of war detention 
standards and the personal jurisdiction requirements for military commis-
sions has been ideologically problematic for some. Second, in order to pros-
ecute a detainee in a forum other than the detaining power’s own military 
courts, it must be determined that the detainee is an unlawful enemy 
combatant.34
That unlawful combatants are not entitled to combatant immunity 
and may be tried by military commission has historical roots. Attorney 
General James Speed noted in 1865 in reference to the Lincoln co-
conspirators that “[a] bushwhacker, a jayhawker, a bandit, a war rebel, an 
assassin, being public enemies, may be tried, condemned, and executed as 
offenders against the laws of war.”35
Men, or squads of men, who commit hostilities, whether by fighting, or in-
roads for destruction or plunder, or by raids of any kind, without commis-
sion, without being part and portion of the organized hostile army, and 
without sharing continuously in the war, but who do so with intermitting 
returns to their homes and avocations, or with the occasional assumption 
of the semblance of peaceful pursuits, divesting themselves of the charac-
ter or appearance of soldiers—such men, or squads of men, are not public 
enemies, and, therefore, if captured, are not entitled to the privileges of 
prisoners of war, but shall be treated summarily as highway robbers or 
pirates.
The Lieber Code similarly distinguish-
es between lawful combatants and:
36
The concept of “unprivileged belligerency” dates back to jus mili-
tair (chivalry) and the Just War tradition, both of which included the re-
quirement for war to be authorized by “the right authority.”37
33 GCIII, supra note 5, arts. 118–19. See also Derek Jinks, The Declining Significance of 
POW Status, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 367, 437 (2004) (stating that “all enemy combatants, even 
if POWs, may be detained without criminal charge for the duration of the hostilities.” 
(emphasis in original)). See also United States v. Khadr, CMCR 07-001 (Ct. Mil. Comm’n
Rev. 2007), available at http://www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/archives/CMCR%20ruling
%209-24-07.pdf.
In this sense 
“public war” was contrary to assassins and acts of perfidy. The principle of 
discrimination paralleled the “right authority” concept. Combatants were to 
34 See Khadr, CMCR 07-001 at 5 (citing customary international law, as well as provi-
sions of the GPW to support this analysis).
35 11 Op. Att’y. Gen. 297, 314 (1865). See LESLIE C. GREEN, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF 
ARMED CONFLICT 104 (2000) (citing GEORG FRIEDRICH VON MARTENS, XII A COMPENDIUM 
OF THE LAW OF NATIONS, ch. III § 2 (William Cobbett trans., 1802)).
36 Lieber Code, supra note 24, art. 82. The Lieber Code also provides that combatants not 
satisfying the POW status requirements could be captured and summarily executed. Id.
art. 85.
37 See G.I.A.D. Draper, The Status of Combatants and the Question of Guerilla Warfare,
45 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L. L. 173, 176, n.2 (1971).
178 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 42:171
distinguish themselves from civilians, and civilians, in turn, were not to take 
up arms lest they be targeted as combatants themselves. Civilians who en-
gaged in hostilities against military forces were denied lawful status and the 
entitlement to POW protections.
Although the term “unlawful combatant” has generated some criti-
cism,38 primarily due to its absence from the authoritative law of war trea-
ties and conventions, the legal effect of such a designation is no less signifi-
cant. Enemy combatants who are not entitled to take part in the conflict lose 
the combatant’s immunity.39 In fact, the drafters of the Geneva Conven-
tions—in spite of claims by some that the Geneva regime protects all per-
sons with no “gaps”—did not intend to provide protection to unlawful com-
batants.40
In Lindh, the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia 
noted that unlawful combatants are civilians and may be detained and pros-
ecuted under the domestic laws of the detaining power for any unlawful 
combat activity.
Case law and recent scholarship indicate that this concept holds 
true today.
41 This follows the WWII Nazi saboteur decision, Ex parte 
Quirin, which states that “[u]nlawful combatants are likewise subject to 
capture and detention, but in addition they are subject to trial and punish-
ment by military tribunals for acts which render their belligerency unlaw-
ful.”42 More recently, at least one commentator has noted that unlawful 
combatants may be prosecuted and punished merely for participating in 
hostilities.43
Losing combatant immunity does not mean that a detainee is com-
pletely removed from the protections of Geneva. Unlawful combatants still 
receive the base line protections of Common Article 3 to the Geneva Con-
38 See, e.g., Jack M. Beard, Agora: Military Commissions Act of 2006: The Geneva Boo-
merang: The Military Commissions Act of 2006 and U.S. Counterterror Operations, 101 AM.
J. INT’L L. 56, 59–60 (2007). See also GREEN, supra note 35, at 104 n.13. (“It is not strictly 
correct to describe them as ‘unlawful combatants’, since they are non-combatants unlawfully 
taking part in combat.”).
39 GREEN, supra note 35, at 105 (stating “it matters little whether we use the term soldiers 
or combatants, so long as we mean thereby those who are embodied in a state’s armed forces 
and are entitled to take part in conflict.”). See also Jinks, supra note 33, at 422 (stating that 
“unlawful combatants are not entitled to participate in the hostilities and consequently may 
be prosecuted and punished for doing so.”).
40 See II-A FINAL RECORD OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE OF GENEVA OF 1949, at 622 
(1949).
41 United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541, 554 (E.D. Va. 2002) (citing Ex parte Qui-
rin, 317 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1942)).
42 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 31. See also United States v. Khadr, CMCR 07-001 at 6 
(Ct. Mil. Comm’n Rev. 2007), available at http://www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/
archives/CMCR%20ruling%209-24-07.pdf.
43 See Jinks, supra note 33, at 422.
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ventions, which includes humane treatment. Moreover, Common Article 3 
requires that detainees be tried by regularly constituted courts of the detain-
ing power.44 The military commissions are such regularly constituted 
courts, particularly due to the extensive procedural rights afforded the ac-
cused.45
2. Geneva as a source of rights & the War Crimes Act
Nonetheless, as the next section discusses, the MCA has come un-
der fire for other provisions related to the Geneva Conventions.
The MCA specifically references the Geneva Conventions in two 
controversial provisions. First, under § 948b(g) the MCA provides that
“[n]o alien unlawful enemy combatant subject to trial by military commis-
sion under this chapter may invoke the Geneva Conventions as a source of
rights.”46 Although this provision has drawn sharp criticism,47 it does not 
appear to have been intended to limit the arguments of the accused at mili-
tary commissions.48 Even though the scope of this provision has never been 
resolved, it is worth noting that commissions have considered Geneva-
related issues, including whether the accused is entitled to have his status as 
a prisoner of war determined by a GCIII, Article 5 tribunal, and whether the 
accused qualifies for protections under the Fourth Geneva Convention 
(GCIV).49
The MCA also amends the War Crimes Act in significant ways. 
Previously, the War Crimes Act punished any violation of Common Article 
3.50 The MCA provides that only “grave breaches” of Common Article 3 
are criminalized, as defined in part by Article 129 of GCIII.51
44 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 635 (2006); Khadr, CMCR 07-001 at 6–7.
While critics 
maintain that this amendment impermissibly limits prosecutable offenses 
45 See JENNIFER K. ELSEA, THE MILITARY COMMISSIONS ACT OF 2006: ANALYSIS OF 
PROCEDURAL RULES AND COMPARISON WITH PREVIOUS DOD RULES AND THE UNIFORM CODE 
OF MILITARY JUSTICE (Congressional Research Service 2007), available at https://www.
policyarchive.org/handle/10207/19896.
46 Military Commissions Act of 2006, 10 U.S.C. § 948(b)(g) (2006).
47 But see David A. Martin, Judicial Review and the Military Commissions Act: On Strik-
ing the Right Balance, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 344, 353 (2007) (“Though ostensibly quite restric-
tive, the wording could be found to leave room for a court to enforce Geneva-sourced rights 
sua sponte.”).
48 Bradley, supra note 12, at 327–28 (citing 152 CONG. REC. S10,401-02 (daily ed. Sept. 
28, 2006) (Senators McCain, Warner and Graham stating that “it is not the intent of Congress 
to dictate what can or cannot be said by litigants in any case.”)).
49 See infra Part III.
50 18 U.S.C. § 2441(c) (2000).
51 18 U.S.C. § 2441(c)–(d) (2006); GCIII, supra note 5, arts. 129–30. See also Bradley, 
supra note 12, at 329 (observing that the MCA definition of “grave breaches” notably omits 
the denial of fair and regular trials and humiliating and degrading treatment).
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under Common Article 3,52 it is unclear that the “grave breaches” provisions 
of Article 129 apply to Common Article 3 at all, since Article 3 applies only 
to conduct taking place in non-international armed conflicts.53
Whether the MCA complies fully with U.S. treaty obligations has 
not been resolved in the courts. However, there is ample authority that if the 
MCA conflicts with a treaty then the MCA prevails as later in time. Accord-
ing to Curtis Bradley “it is well settled that Congress has the authority to 
override treaties for the purposes of U.S. law.”54
Besides treaty obligations, many will argue that the MCA is subor-
dinate to the customary laws of war. Commentators rely on the Paquete 
Habana case for the position that “international law is our law.” While this 
is true, the Supreme Court explained further that international law is rele-
vant to U.S. courts “where there is no treaty and no controlling executive or 
legislative act or judicial decision . . . .”
While the later-in-time 
rule does not relieve the U.S. of its international legal obligations, it will be 
instrumental to determining the applicable legal standard in domestic 
litigation. 
55
At least one commentator presents another argument against the 
MCA’s approach to Geneva. David A. Martin states “an individual detainee 
should still be permitted to refer to the Geneva Conventions as the basis for 
a Charming Betsy argument affecting how a court should construe a particu-
lar statutory provision.”
There can be no argument that the 
MCA is the legislative act that controls the field in terms of the standards 
applied at military commission trials. 
56 In the Charming Betsy case, the Supreme Court 
held that an ambiguous statute should be construed, to the extent possible, 
not to conflict with international law.57 However, as applied by the Second 
Circuit, “[t]his canon of statutory interpretation . . . does not apply where 
the statute at issue admits no relevant ambiguity.”58
52 See Martin, supra note 47, 353 n.39 (citing Michael J. Matheson, The Amendment of the 
War Crimes Act, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 48, 52 (2007)).
In this case, Congress 
53 See Bradley, supra note 12, at 329 n.47 (citing Matheson, supra note 52).
54 Bradley, supra note 12, at 339 (citing Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 376 (1998); The 
Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 
194 (1888); Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 597–99 (1884)).
55 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
56 Martin, supra note 47, at 353.
57 Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (stating that “an 
act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible 
construction remains . . . .”). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS 
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 114 (1987) (“Where fairly possible, a United States statute is 
to be construed so as not to conflict with international law or with an international agreement 
of the United States.”).
58 Olivia v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 433 F.3d 229, 235 (2d Cir. 2005).
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could not have been more clear regarding the MCA’s interpretation and 
application of the Geneva Conventions.59
In spite of this authority, critics of the military commissions will 
continue to argue that the MCA deviates from the requirements of the Ge-
neva Conventions. These arguments do not take into account that Common 
Article 3, which is the benchmark for military commission procedures ac-
cording to Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, was intended only to prevent “summary 
justice.”60 Whatever can be said about the procedures of military commis-
sions, they are certainly not summary.61
III. THE APPLICATION OF GENEVA AT MILITARY COMMISSIONS
In fact, the following section ex-
amines pre-trial litigation at the commissions, illustrating the extent to 
which the Geneva Conventions are applied in practice. 
The Geneva Conventions have been the subject of vigorous litiga-
tion at the Guantánamo Bay military commissions. This section discusses 
two rulings in United States v. Hamdan that demonstrate this practice. First, 
Hamdan’s commission ruled that the al-Qaeda suspect was due an Article 5 
status determination hearing under GCIII.62 Second, the military judge later 
ruled that the accused was not entitled to the protections of the civilian con-
vention under GCIV.63
A. United States v. Hamdan and Article 5 Status Determinations
The Hamdan case illustrates that the accused at mili-
tary commissions have every opportunity to challenge the applicability of 
various provisions of the Geneva Conventions. 
Salim Hamdan argued prior to the commencement of his trial that 
he was entitled to an Article 5 hearing.64 Article 5 status hearings are held in 
order to determine whether a captured enemy combatant qualifies for the 
protections of the prisoner of war convention.65
59 For further discussion, see Bradley, supra note 12, at 342.
These hearings are to be 
60 ICRC COMMENTARY III, supra note 6, at 39–40 (“We must be very clear about one 
point; it is only ‘summary’ justice which it is intended to prohibit.”).
61 See ELSEA, supra note 45, at 1–2.
62 See Ruling on Defense Motion for Article 5 Status Determination, United States v. 
Hamdan (December 17, 2007), http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Dec2007/HAMDAN%
20ARTICLE%205%20RULING%2017%20Dec%202007.pdf [hereinafter Article 5 Status].
63 See United States v. Hamdan, Ruling on Motion for Order Implementing Fourth Geneva 
Convention (Allred, J.) (Mar.24, 2008), available at http://www.pegc.us/archive/
Hamdan_v_Rumsfeld/MC_ruling_20080324.pdf [hereinafter Hamdan GCIV Ruling].
64 See Article 5 Status, supra note 62.
65 GCIII, supra note 5, art. 5.
The Present Convention shall apply to the persons referred to in Article 4 from the 
time they fall into the power of the enemy and until their final release and repatria-
tion. Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having committed a belligerent 
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provided if there is any doubt as to the detainee’s status, a standard reflected 
in Army Regulation 190-8, which implements the Geneva standard for bat-
tlefield practice.66 In this case, Hamdan was charged with conspiracy and 
material support for terrorism.67 Specifically, the government would show 
that Hamdan knowingly transported and guarded bin Laden before, during, 
and after the 9/11 terror attacks, he transported weapons and ammunition 
for al-Qaeda including two surface-to-air missiles, and he received weapons 
training.68
In response to the defense motion for an Article 5 hearing, the gov-
ernment argued that the accused was not entitled to an Article 5 hearing in 
part because he had already been determined to be an “enemy combatant” 
by a Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT).69 The military judge disa-
greed. He rejected the CSRT’s finding because it failed to adequately de-
termine whether the accused was entitled to POW status, there was no refer-
ence to the Geneva Conventions or Article 5, and there was no analysis as to 
the lawfulness of his combatant status.70 Limited by the Department of De-
fense regulations,71 Hamdan’s CSRT only focused on whether he would 
remain an “enemy combatant” for the purpose of continued detention.72
Judge Keith Allred correctly noted that the status determination 
should be decided before trial “if at all possible, because on it depends the 
whole array of procedural protections accorded to Prisoners of War, by the 
Third Convention, and the issue may go to the jurisdiction of the tribunal.”73
act and having fallen into the hands of the enemy, belongs to any of the categories 
enumerated in Article 4, such persons shall enjoy the protection of the present 
Convention until such time as their status has been determined by a competent 
tribunal.
Id.
66 Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other Detainees,
Army Reg. 190-8, § 1-1(b) (1997), available at http://www.usapa.army.mil/pdffiles/
r190_8.pdf.
67 Referred Charge Sheet, United States v. Hamdan (May 1, 2007), http://www.
defenselink.mil/news/May2007/Hamdan_Charges.pdf.
68 Id.
69 See Article 5 Status, supra note 62.
70 Id. at 3–4.
71 See Memorandum from Paul Wolfowitz to the Secretary of the Navy, Order Establish-
ing Combatant Status Review Tribunal to the Secretary of the Navy (July 7, 2004), available 
at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/d20040707review.pdf. The CSRT system was 
later embraced by Congress in the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA). See Detainee 
Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739, § 1005e(2)(A)(2005).
72 Article 5 Status, supra note 62, at 3–4.
73 Id. at 2 (quoting COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE 
GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 556 (Yves Sandoz et. al., eds., 1988)).
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This analysis follows the Court of Military Commission Review decision in 
United States v. Khadr, which provides:
[Article 45(2) of Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions] suggests that a de-
tained individual who is not being held as a POW has the right to assert an 
entitlement to POW status before a judicial tribunal, and that judicial adju-
dication of combatant status shall occur before trial for any alleged subs-
tantive offense. Following the M.C.A. procedures, as we interpret them 
here, would allow an accused to assert a claim of POW (i.e., lawful com-
batant) status at a pretrial motion session before the military judge. This 
pretrial determination of status would be fully in accord with Article 45(2) 
of Protocol I.74
On its face, it would appear that Article 5 does not apply to an ac-
cused al-Qaeda terrorist, with whom the U.S. is engaged in a non-
international armed conflict.75 The accused’s association with al-Qaeda,
however, was not established at the time Judge Allred made his ruling.76
Ultimately, Hamdan’s commission determined that he was an alien 
unlawful enemy combatant. The broader protections of GCIII did not apply, 
and he was subject to the jurisdiction of the military commission. Hamdan’s 
status would play an important role in another motion calling for the appli-
cation of the protections of the civilian convention. 
Even when Hamdan’s status was established in a ruling two days later, the 
commission made no indication as to the nature of the underlying conflict. 
This naturally left open the possible application of the full panoply of 
Geneva’s protections, not just those reserved for non-international armed 
conflicts. 
B. Hamdan and Civilian Status 
After Hamdan’s military commission determined that he was not 
entitled to Prisoner of War status, he moved to be determined a civilian sub-
ject to the protections of the Fourth Geneva Convention.77 The defense rea-
soned that no one participating in armed conflict can be without status.78
74 United States v. Khadr, CMCR 07-001 at 25, n.38 (Ct. Mil. Comm’n Rev. 2007), avail-
able at http://www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/archives/CMCR%20ruling%209-24-07.pdf.
See also Additional Protocol I, supra note 23, art. 45; Jinks, supra note 33, at 386.
In 
75 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 629 n.61 (2006).
76 The commission determined that Hamdan was an alien unlawful enemy combatant 
subject to the jurisdiction of the military commission two days later. See United States v. 
Hamdan, On Reconsideration Ruling on Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, at 8 
(Allred, J.) (Dec. 19, 2007), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Dec2007/
HamdanJurisdiction%20After%20Reconsideration%20Ruling.pdf.
77 See Hamdan GCIV Ruling, supra note 63.
78 Id. at 2.
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other words, having failed to satisfy the requirements for prisoner of war 
status, the accused must be considered a civilian under GCIV.  Citing Jean 
Pictet, who is widely considered authoritative in international humanitarian 
law, the defense argued that, “[t]here is no intermediate status; nobody in 
enemy hands can be outside the law.”79 The military judge agreed that this 
is the general rule, but certain exceptions apply.80
The plain language of the Convention excludes from its protection, 
“[n]ationals of a neutral state [Yemen] who find themselves in the territory 
of a belligerent state [Afghanistan] . . . while the State of which they are 
nationals [Yemen] has diplomatic representation in the State in whose 
hands [American] they are.”81 The Commission rightfully concluded that 
Article 4 of GCIV did not apply because Yemen, Hamdan’s state of natio-
nality, continued to have diplomatic relations with the U.S.82
The commission cites leading scholars to support the conclusion 
that Article 4 of GCIV excludes certain persons. Helen Duffy writes that 
“[c]ertain limited categories of persons may, however, be excluded [from 
protected person status] by GCIV, which is principally directed towards the 
protection of civilians associated with the adversary against whom the state 
is engaged in conflict. The Convention appears on its face to exclude na-
tionals of co-belligerent states and neutral states.”83
Even Jean Pictet addressed possible derogations from the protec-
tions of GCIV. He stated that:
Some people considered that [GCIV] should apply without exception to all 
persons to whom it referred, while to others it seemed obvious that persons 
guilty of violating the laws of war were not entitled to claim its 
benefits . . . . Those who take part in the struggle while not belonging to 
the armed forces are acting deliberately outside the laws of warfare.84
The compromise to this debate is found in Article 5 of GCIV. It 
provides that persons who would otherwise be protected under the Conven-
tion but who are “suspected of or engaged in activities hostile to the security
79 Id. (citing COMMENTARY, IV GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF 
CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 51 (Jean Pictet ed., 1958) [hereinafter COMMENTARY]).
80 Hamdan GCIV Ruling, supra note 63, at 2.
81 Id. at 3 (emphasis in original) (citing COMMENTARY, supra note 79, at 48–49). 
82 Hamdan GCIV Ruling, supra note 63, at 3.
83 Id. (citing HELEN DUFFY, THE WAR ON TERROR AND THE FRAMEWORK OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 402 (2005)).
84 Hamdan GCIV Ruling, supra note 63, at 4 (quoting COMMENTARY, supra note 79, at 
52–53). 
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of the State, such individual person[s] shall not be entitled to claim such 
rights and privileges under the present Convention.”85
Professor Yoram Dinstein notes that an unlawful combatant “is a 
combatant in the sense that he can be lawfully targeted by the enemy, but he 
cannot claim the privileges pertaining to lawful combatancy. Nor does he 
enjoy the benefits of civilian status: Article 5 [of GCIV] . . . specifically 
permits derogation from the rights of such a person . . . .”86
In addition to legal scholars, the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia has weighed in on the issue of derogation from the 
protections of GCIV. In the  case, the Trial Chamber wrote: 
There is no gap between the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions. If an 
individual is not entitled to the protection of the Third Convention as a 
prisoner of war or of the First or Second Convention, he or she necessarily 
falls within the ambit of [the Fourth Convention], provided that its Article 
4 requirements are satisfied.87
Therefore, unlawful combatants failing the requirements of Article 
4 to GCIV will not be afforded its protections. Judge Allred’s reliance on 
these authorities in the Hamdan ruling demonstrates one thing—the military 
commissions have not shied away from the application of the laws of war. 
Rather, they adhered to the Geneva Conventions quite faithfully. Moreover, 
there was no effort to remove accused entirely from the protections of Ge-
neva. As Judge Allred stated, “[Hamdan] is among that unusual class of 
persons not protected by either GC III or GC IV, but entitled to the minimal 
protections of Common Article 3.”88
IV. CONCLUSION
How then do we “bridge the gap” of
those left relatively unprotected?  
The military commissions have faithfully applied the laws of war. 
Nonetheless, critics still maintain that the U.S. requires its enemies to abide 
by the laws of war while denying them the protections of Geneva. In reality, 
everyone engaged in armed conflict is required to follow the laws of war.89
85 Hamdan GCIV Ruling, supra note 63, at 4 (quoting Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 5, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 
U.N.T.S. 287).
To complete the quote by Pictet above, “[t]hose who take part in the strug-
86 Hamdan GCIV Ruling, supra note 63, at 5 (quoting YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF 
HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 29–30 (2004)).
87 Hamdan GCIV Ruling, supra note 63, at 5 (quoting Prosecutor v. Del

	-
96-21-T, Judgment, ¶ 271 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Former Yugoslavia Trial Chamber II Nov. 
16, 1998)) (emphasis added).
88 Hamdan GCIV Ruling, supra note 63, at 5.
89 See Bellinger, supra note 7.
186 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 42:171
gle while not belonging to the armed forces are acting deliberately outside 
the laws of warfare. Surely they know the dangers to which they are expos-
ing themselves.”90
At the heart of the matter is how these laws apply to persons on the 
battlefield, not just the courtroom. Curtis Bradley notes that, “[t]he Geneva 
Conventions concern the ways a nation’s military interacts with classes of 
people during armed conflict.”
The danger is exposure to a massive gap in the Geneva 
protective framework. 
91
Ultimately, the question is not whether Geneva was present at 
Guantánamo Bay. The truth is that the military commissions applied the law 
of armed conflict rigorously and with greater intellectual honesty than crit-
ics will dare admit.
Today, when our military applies these 
laws at least one class of people is not included in this paradigm—the un-
privileged belligerent. If the purpose of the law of armed conflict is to ex-
tend the full spectrum of Geneva’s protections to all persons on the contem-
porary front lines, then the laws of war must be amended.  For now, unlaw-
ful combatants will only find solace in the base line protections of Common 
Article 3.  Perhaps this is as it should be.  It must be considered whether the 
law should change to oblige derogations of unlawful actors, or whether 
combatants themselves must conform their actions to the existing laws go-
verning armed conflict.
90 Hamdan GCIV Ruling, supra note 63, at 4 (quoting COMMENTARY, supra note 79, at
52–53) (emphasis added).
91 Bradley, supra note 12, at 338.
